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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In July 2017, both the Islamic State of Iraq and (greater) Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the 
Arab Peninsula (AQAP) exhorted their followers around the world to derail trains. AQAP 
included in its online magazine detailed instructions on how to make a derailment device. 
According to the database maintained by the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI), in the 
nearly 12 months since the two leading jihadist groups suggested derailing trains, there 
has been no noticeable uptick in attempts. 
MTI’s database shows that between 1970 and the end of 2017, there were 282 attempts 
to deliberately derail trains and 817 additional attacks on railway infrastructure, including 
tracks, bridges, tunnels, signaling, and other right-of-way equipment. Of the 282 attempts 
to derail trains, 118 (or 42%) resulted in a derailment.
Derailments are intended to cause casualties, while attacks on tracks and other right-of-
way infrastructure are primarily intended to cause disruption and attract attention.
South Asia leads in the number of derailment attempts with 57.8% of the attempts, followed 
by the countries of Western Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa. South Asia also 
accounts for 54.4% of the fatalities. While Western Europe accounts for 10.6% of the 
attacks, it accounts for less than one percent of the fatalities. The overall average number 
of fatalities per attack (FPA) is 3.8. (A similar measure of lethality used in the charts is for 
injuries, stated as injuries per attack, or IPA).
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were used to derail trains in 75.7% of the cases. 
Mechanical means of sabotage (by removing bolts or rails, loosening plates, or tampering 
with switches) were employed in nearly all the remaining cases.
Mechanical means of derailments have a higher lethality rate per attack than do derailments 
using IEDs. Derailments caused by IEDs account for 23.6% of the total number of deaths. 
Mechanical means of sabotage account for 48.8% of the fatalities. Mechanical derailments 
are by far the most lethal form of attacking the passenger train network. 
Attackers placed a total of 279 IEDs in the attacks, 58.1% of which detonated on target. The 
remainder were discovered before detonation and rendered safe, or they malfunctioned. 
In the remaining cases, the device exploded but was not placed correctly. 
The deadliest attacks were those which combined derailments with armed assaults. These 
accounted for 27.6% of total fatalities, but a single episode in Angola killing 259 accounts 
for a large share of these fatalities. Excluding this incident, the figures shift somewhat, but 
the conclusion remains the same. Derailments caused by mechanical sabotage account for 
64.4% of the fatalities; derailments by bombings alone account for 31.1% of the fatalities.
The rate of bomb-caused and mechanical derailments have both increased over time, with 
bomb attacks showing the greater increase. Lethality, however, has increased only slightly 
overall. This appears due mainly to the declining lethality of derailment attacks involving 
bombs, whereas the lethality of mechanical attacks appears to have increased significantly. 
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Derailment attacks have not increased nearly as much as all other attacks on all passengers 
in all surface transportation targets (including passenger trains and stations, buses 
and bus stations and stops, and passenger ferries and ferry terminals). This suggests 
that adversaries are increasingly going after surface transportation targets, but are 
concentrating on easier modes of attack. The lethality of derailment attacks is increasing 
slightly, however, while the lethality of all other attacks against passenger targets, and 
then train passenger targets, is decreasing – a significant finding.
Track attacks are also increasing, although this may be the result of improved reporting. 
80.9% of the attacks were directed at railway tracks, bridges and tunnels, and not other 
infrastructure such as signaling and power systems.
Most track attacks are designed to disrupt, not to kill. Only 48 persons were killed and 
268 injured in 817 attacks. Most of the deaths derived from attacks where security and 
maintenance personnel working on the tracks were targeted. 
Bombing is the most common tactic in track attacks, accounting for 85.9% of the attacks, 
followed by mechanical sabotage and arson. Remarkably, 26.7% of the IEDs were 
discovered before they detonated.
In order to examine differences in motives, objectives, and modes of operating, the 
researchers looked at four specific groups of perpetrators: an assemblage of anarchist 
and environmentalist extremists in Europe; Maoist guerrillas in India; separatist insurgents 
in southern Thailand; and jihadists worldwide. These particular attackers were chosen 
because they have engaged in continuing campaigns which account for a large share of 
recent attacks where the perpetrators have been identified.
European extremists, who carried out attacks on tracks and right-of-way infrastructure in 
four countries (Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and France) relied primarily on mechanical 
means of sabotage (45%) and improvised incendiary devices (42%) rather than explosive 
devices. There were no casualties in any of the attacks.
India’s Maoist or Naxalite guerrillas were the most prolific attackers, accounting for 37 
derailment attempts and 135 track attacks. Their derailment attacks had the second 
highest lethality ranking after the jihadists. Over the long run, their attacks appear to be 
increasing in volume and lethality.
Separatist insurgents in southern Thailand accounted for 44 attacks (both attempted 
derailments and track attacks). Although competent bombmakers (95% of their devices 
detonated on target), they placed a distant third in the lethality of their derailment attempts, 
suggesting self-imposed constraints. 
The jihadists are not the most prolific attackers and not the most competent bombmakers, 
but have achieved the highest lethality — their fatalities-per-attack score for derailments is 
nearly four times that of the Maoist guerrillas and seven times more than the average for 
all derailment attempts.
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I. ATTEMPTS TO DERAIL PASSENGER TRAINS AND 
DISRUPT RAIL TRANSPORTATION 
Attempts to sabotage rails and deliberately derail passenger trains have a long history in 
conventional and guerrilla warfare as well as during some particularly bitter labor disputes 
in the past. Since the 1970s, political fanatics have become a major adversary. Terrorists 
have sought to derail trains to achieve high-casualty events, while anarchists and issue-
oriented extremists have attacked rails to attract attention to their causes and impose 
economic damage. 
In the following report, we examine the more than a thousand attempts to derail trains 
and to attack rail infrastructure to discern overall patterns and trends. We then look at 
four subsets of attacks in greater detail: those by India’s Maoist guerrillas; those by 
separatist insurgents in Thailand; those by various jihadist groups worldwide; and those 
by an assemblage of anarchists, environmental and similar cause-oriented extremists in 
Europe. How do these adversaries compare in terms of tactics, success rates, lethality, 
and other factors? Do their different objectives and circumstances affect their actions? 
Perhaps most important, is there evidence that they become more effective and lethal 
over time?
THE LATEST JIHADIST APPEALS
As the Islamic State steadily lost ground to counterterrorist offensives in Iraq and Syria, ISIS 
followers discussed various ways to cause catastrophes and impact Western economies, 
including derailing high-speed commuter trains and blowing up oil and gas pipelines. 
Since its emergence in 2013, ISIS has issued a torrent of exhortations and appeals to 
its followers to take action wherever they are, often suggesting specific forms of attack. 
Much of this is propaganda calculated to impress followers and frighten foes. However, 
the 2015 attempted armed assault on passengers in a high-speed train traveling between 
Amsterdam and Paris, the bombing attacks on the subway system in Brussels in 2016 and 
on its central train station in 2017, and an attack on train passengers in Germany in 2016 
by ISIS supporters, made it clear that public surface transportation presents an enticing 
target to jihadists. 
At nearly the same time, AQAP featured the idea of derailing trains in the 17th issue of its 
online magazine Inspire. A lead article by Ibrahim ibn Hassan al-Asri discusses the utility 
of attacks on transportation systems in general.1 A Saudi jihadist who is believed to be 
AQAP’s lead bomb maker and considered responsible for building the devices used by 
the Underwear bomber in 2009 as well as for another plot to sabotage airliners uncovered 
in 2012, al-Asri seems to have become the group’s Chief Technology Officer, a sort of 
terrorist Tom Swift, inventing new schemes for attack. While articles like the one in Inspire 
fuel jihadist fantasies, they also are intended to encourage the kind of audacious scenarios 
and spectacular actions jihadist leaders want and, therefore, they are indicators of intent.
In the article, al-Asri argues that with few resources, it is possible to achieve great results 
by attacking transportation systems. Attacks on transportation will cause alarm and affect 
people in all walks of life, he writes, giving the appearance “of looming danger everywhere.” 
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Attempts to Derail Passenger Trains and Disrupt Rail Transportation 
Increasing security measures, he points out, only “increases the feeling of insecurity and 
fear among the people.” Such attacks are “disastrous to the economy,” especially “if they 
occur regularly.” 
Derailing trains to achieve mass casualties has attracted al Qaeda’s planners for years. 
Computer files recovered during the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan 
indicated that at the time of his death, the leader of al Qaeda was looking for ways to carry 
out a major terrorist attack in the United States in order to demonstrate that the jihadist 
enterprise was still in business ten years after 9/11. Reportedly, his proposed plan, which 
dated back to February 2010, was to derail a passenger train as it crossed a high bridge, 
sending the coaches plunging into a river or deep valley, potentially killing hundreds. 
Al-Asri goes on to describe two ways to target rail lines. The first is to destroy rail lines 
to create delay and disruption. The second is to destroy the line just “minutes before the 
train arrives, so as to derail the train.” In this report, we have divided railway attacks into 
attacks on rails and other infrastructure intended to cause disruption and attacks intended 
to cause derailments of passenger trains. 
Trains careening into ravines are a common terrorist fantasy. We do not know what may 
have inspired Osama bin Laden’s 2010 scenario. Deadly accidents have sometimes 
provided ideas for terrorists. In Pakistan, bin Laden would have been able to read about 
the numerous accidents as well as incidents of sabotage that affected both Pakistan and 
India. Derailments, accidental or deliberate, are not uncommon in these two countries. 
Together, India and Pakistan account for 56 percent of both track and derailment attacks, 
and more than 50 percent of attempted derailments.
Issue 17 of Inspire displays a timeline of train major derailments in America dating back 
to 1904. None of these were the result of sabotage, but are offered as evidence of the 
significant casualties that are possible when a train derails. The feature story of Issue 17 
provides a plotted history of transportation in the modern world followed by a discussion 
of how trains stay on rails. It illustrates a portable derailer, which is used by railroads in 
situations where it is necessary to ensure that unauthorized train movements or unattended 
rolling stock do not accidentally proceed beyond some point. 
The magazine then describes a “design concept for the homemade derail tool,” using 
reinforced concrete, and provides step-by-step instructions for making one and advice on 
how to place it to cause maximum death and destruction. It notes that the “lone Mujahid 
(or warrior) will have to be aware of train routes and traffic patterns and should try to place 
the device about ten minutes before the targeted train passes.” To assist, the magazine 
includes a list of the major passenger train routes in America and a map displaying railroad 
lines by ownership. 
The information on routes is readily available on the Internet and far too general to be 
operationally useful, while the operation called for is more challenging than the article 
implies. Some of the techniques things described in previous issues of Inspire probably 
would not work, and it is not clear that the derailing device as described would derail a 
speeding train or instead be knocked off the tracks or pulverized by the wheels. 
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Attempts to Derail Passenger Trains and Disrupt Rail Transportation 
As with all propaganda, terrorist propaganda is aimed primarily at the home front—would-
be jihadists. The objective of such articles is to motivate followers to do things that are 
theoretically within their reach, but also to enable its readers to fantasize that, even if they 
don’t build derailers, which few will do, they are in on the jihad. Rather than boring sermons 
on ideology or theoretical discussions of tactics, illustrated instructions on how to build 
terrorist devices, beyond any instructional value, are a means of engaging the intended 
audience (at least vicariously) in the armed struggle. It introduces eager readers into the 
realm of violence, encouraging them to think as if they themselves were engaged in “the 
real thing,” a dangerous and exciting campaign of death and destruction. It is terrorist porn. 
A third objective is to enable the jihadist organizations to claim credit for events that 
subsequently occur. It makes no difference if an attack was actually inspired by the jihadist 
appeal —a tactic was proposed, and an attack took place.
MTI’S 2010 STUDY OF DELIBERATE DERAILMENTS 
This is not a new area of MTI inquiry. In a 2010 report, MTI published the results of an 
analysis of the 181 derailment attempts then in its database, most of them by terrorists, 
including environmental extremists, as well as other adversaries; 170 of these occurred 
after 1970. (The 11 other cases, which took place between 1920 and 1969, were set aside 
because of lack of data during this period about anything but the most spectacular and 
lethal attacks.) 
In the eight years since the 2010 study, MTI has updated its database, has added some 
incidents previously missed or about which little information was available at the time, and 
was able to obtain additional details on other incidents. All of this enabled the authors to 
take a more detailed look at these tactics. The following brief review of the 2010 findings 
points out further changes to the earlier analysis.
This 2010 analysis found that derailment attacks overall between 1970 and the end of 
2009 accounted for 10.5 percent of the all attacks on public surface transportation and 
9.5 percent of all fatalities.2 
South Asia accounted for roughly a third of events, followed by Western Europe, Russia 
and the NIS (Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union), the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia.3 By country, India, Russia, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and Thailand lead 
the list. The distinction between the “developed” and “developing” world is blurring and 
these terms are used less frequently, but dividing the world according to this old concept 
it appears that the majority of the attacks occurred in the “developing” world, again led 
by India and Pakistan, which together accounted for about a third of all incidents. The 
average number of fatalities per attack in the “developed” world was 2.3 compared to 
4.7 fatalities per attack in the “developing” world. 
Bombs were the most common method employed. Bombs were placed on (near or under) 
the tracks in 149 of the 181 cases, for a total of 82.3 percent. Mechanical means of 
sabotage (removing bolts, tracks, etc.) were used in 27 incidents (or 14.9 percent) of the 
cases. The five remaining cases involved other means. 
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Terrorists and other adversaries may attempt to derail trains by placing improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) next to the tracks or burying them beneath the rails. We refer to 
these devices in the database as “track bombs.” Alternatively, saboteurs may attempt to 
derail trains by removing spikes; loosening or removing the spikes, bolts and plates that 
hold the rails in place; or removing portions of the track itself. In a few cases, saboteurs 
have attempted to derail trains by placing concrete blocks or other objects on the rails. We 
refer to these various methods here as “mechanical means.” 
When there are no bombs, it is not always clearly established that a derailment is deliberate. 
In a few cases where operators have claimed or authorities have suspected sabotage, 
allegations also have been made that operators were trying to avoid responsibility for poor 
maintenance by blaming imaginary saboteurs. 
The 2010 study did not try to count track attacks as a separate category from derailment 
attempts. It focused exclusively on derailment attempts, although the authors noted that 
in a few cases it was not always clearly established that a derailment was the objective. 
This was especially true in cases where mechanical sabotage was involved, or instead the 
attempt was intended simply to disrupt the railway system. (We have since reexamined 
these cases, imposing a tighter definition on apparent derailment attempts. As a result, 
we have recategorized 10 of the cases as being disruptive attacks rather than attempted 
derailments, leaving 171 derailments or attempted derailments to be included in the 
present study.)
The adversaries succeeded in derailing a train in 69 cases. In 40 more cases, they clearly 
intended to derail a train, but the train passed over but failed to detonate the bomb; the 
bomb detonated but failed to derail the train; or the train was able to stop before reaching 
the point where an explosion had occurred. The intent of the remaining 72 cases is not 
clear. Some appear to have been attempted derailments, but authorities discovered the 
bomb before it detonated. In other cases, the attack may have been intended to merely 
cause disruption, and these have been recategorized as track attacks in the present study. 
Although bombs were almost four times more likely to be used than mechanical means 
of sabotage, the latter proved more effective in derailing trains than bombs. In 149 bomb 
attacks, terrorists were able to derail all or a portion of 47 trains. However, when we limited 
the cases to those where it was clearly the intent of adversaries to derail a train, then in 81 
attempted derailments they succeeded 47 times or 58 percent of the time. In contrast, of 
22 attempted derailments using mechanical means, the adversaries succeeded 19 times 
or 86.4 percent of the time. 
Mechanical means of sabotage also caused more casualties per incident. Events involving 
explosives resulted in an average of four fatalities per event, while events involving 
mechanical sabotage involved an average of 15 fatalities per event. 
In sum, attempted derailments accounted for about a tenth of all incidents and fatalities. 
Most of the attacks and the deadliest attacks occurred in the developing world. Bombs 
were used more often than mechanical sabotage, but mechanical sabotage was more 
effective than explosives in derailing trains and causing casualties. We will see how the 
new study alters these findings.
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II. THE CURRENT ANALYSIS
This current of analysis covers events between 1970 and December 31, 2017. In addition 
to adding the cases that occurred between 2010 and the end of 2017, the analysis 
encompasses a broader array of attacks compared to the 2010 report discussed above. 
The researchers have now included attacks designed to destroy or damage railway 
infrastructure, designed more broadly to include not just attacks against railway tracks, 
bridges and tunnels, but against another set of railway infrastructure targets. These 
include the following targets: (1) Railway Signals, Communications (abbreviated in 
charts as “Comm.”) and Power Systems; (2) Train Service Facilities or Equipment; 
(3) Maintenance or Inspection Trains; (4) Railway Personnel or Company Offices, 
(5) Track-related Personnel Security; and (6) Construction Sites. There are 817 attacks in 
the time period studied.
As mentioned above, we recently reclassified a number of the incidents included in the 
2010 report, and the number of derailment attacks for the 1970 to 2009 period decreased 
from 181 to 171. The current analysis, however, includes 111 additional derailment attacks 
for a total of 282. Using the revised figure for the 1970 to 2009 period and comparing it to 
the increased figure for 1970 to 2017, we see that derailment attacks account for roughly 
the same percentage of attacks on public surface transportation as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Derailments as % of Train Passenger Attacks
Time Period Derailment Attacks
% of All Passenger 
Train Attacks % of All Attacks
1/1/1970 - 12/31/2009 171 22.2% 5.9%
1/1/1970 - 12/31/2017 282 24.0% 5.3%
Looking at the regions of the world, South Asia leads in the number of derailment attempts, 
with 57.8 percent of the attacks, followed by Western Europe and the Middle East and 
North Africa (see Table 2). The distribution of fatalities has South Asia accounting for 
54.4 percent of the total number of fatalities, followed by sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle 
East and North Africa. While Western Europe accounts for 10.9 percent of the attacks, it 
accounts for less than one percent of the fatalities worldwide. The overall average of 
fatalities per attack (FPA) is 3.8. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest FPA average at 56.2. 
Putting aside one exceptionally deadly incident in Angola, which drives this figure, the 
region still has an FPA of 15.6. By contrast, western Europe has an FPA of 0.02.
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Table 2. Derailment Attacks by Region
Region Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
South Asia 163 57.8% 581 3.6 0.0 1,882 11.5 0.0
Western Europe 30 10.6% 6 0.2 0.0 56 1.9 0.0
Middle East and 
North Africa
27 9.6% 58 2.1 0.0 177 6.6 1.0
Russia and the NIS 26 9.2% 42 1.6 0.0 318 12.2 0.0
Southeast Asia 19 6.7% 41 2.2 0.0 177 9.3 1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 6 2.1% 337 56.2 10.0 345 57.5 9.0
Eastern Europe 4 1.4% 0 0.0 0.0 17 4.3 2.5
South America 3 1.1% 2 0.7 0.0 9 3.0 0.0
North America 2 0.7% 1 0.5 0.5 65 32.5 32.5
East Asia 2 0.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Regions 282 100.0% 1,068 3.8 0.0 3,046 10.8 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Turning to individual countries, India alone accounts 29.1% of the attacks, followed by 
Pakistan with 23.4%, and then the Russian Federation with 7.8% (see Table 3). In terms 
of fatalities, India accounts for 45.8 percent of all fatalities from derailments, followed by 
Angola, which had one spectacular case involving 259 fatalities. Pakistan comes next with 
6.3 percent of the fatalities. Once again, the overall FPA is 3.8, and other than Angola and 
Mozambique, which also had a single derailment killing 58 people, the above average FPAs 
were attained in Cambodia (9.3), Algeria (7.3) and finally India (6.0), with a surprisingly 
lower FPA in Pakistan (1.0). The lethality of derailments in Western Europe was very low, 
with the highest being Italy (0.9). 
Table 3. Derailment Attacks by Country
Country Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
India 82 29.1% 489 6.0 0.0 1,334 16.3 0.0
Pakistan 66 23.4% 67 1.0 0.0 361 5.5 0.0
Russian Federation 22 7.8% 42 1.9 0.0 318 14.5 0.0
Turkey 11 3.9% 6 0.5 0.0 59 5.4 1.0
Bangladesh 10 3.5% 25 2.5 0.0 179 17.9 7.0
Thailand 10 3.5% 4 0.4 0.0 71 7.1 0.5
Algeria 7 2.5% 51 7.3 8.0 97 13.9 20.0
Italy 7 2.5% 6 0.9 0.0 54 7.7 0.0
United Kingdom 7 2.5% 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.1 0.0
Germany 6 2.1% 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.2 0.0
France 5 1.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Israel 4 1.4% 0 0.0 0.0 3 0.8 0.5
Spain 4 1.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
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Country Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Sri Lanka 4 1.4% 0 0.0 0.0 8 2.0 2.0
Cambodia 3 1.1% 28 9.3 13.0 85 28.3 5.0
Myanmar 3 1.1% 9 3.0 0.0 9 3.0 2.0
Georgia 3 1.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Angola 2 0.7% 278 139.0 139.0 167 83.5 83.5
Peru 2 0.7% 2 1.0 1.0 9 4.5 4.5
Syria 2 0.7% 1 0.5 0.5 18 9.0 9.0
United States 2 0.7% 1 0.5 0.5 65 32.5 32.5
Egypt 2 0.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 2 0.7% 0 0.0 0.0 12 6.0 6.0
Mozambique 1 0.4% 58 58.0 58.0 160 160.0 160.0
Zambia 1 0.4% 1 1.0 1.0 12 12.0 12.0
Argentina 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Djibouti 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 6 6.0 6.0
Ethiopia 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Iraq 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Japan 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Kosovo 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 5 5.0 5.0
Lithuania 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Macedonia 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Malaysia 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Nepal 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
North Korea 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Poland 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 12 12.0 12.0
All Countries 282 100% 1,068 3.8 0.0 3,046 10.8 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Bombs were the preferred method of derailing trains, accounting for 212 (or 75.7 percent) 
of the 282 attempts. Ten additional incidents saw derailments using explosives combined 
with subsequent armed assaults on the passengers, bringing the total of bombings to 
75.9 percent. 
Fatalities from derailments caused by mechanical means, however, account for 
48.8 percent of the deaths. Mechanical means of sabotage had an FPA of 9.8, more than 
eight times the FPA of those caused by bombings, with an FPA of 1.2. Derailments from 
bombings accounted for only 23.6 percent of the total number of deaths. 
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The deadliest attacks were those which combined derailments with armed assaults. These 
accounted for 27.6 percent of total fatalities, but again a single episode in Angola drives 
these figures up. If this incident is excluded, the figures shift somewhat, but the conclusion 
remains the same. Derailments caused by mechanical sabotage account for 64.4 percent of 
the fatalities, while derailments by bombings alone account for 31.1 percent of the fatalities. 
Comparing mechanical derailments with broader sets of data shows how lethal they are. 
For example, looking at attacks against passenger train targets, which includes train 
stations, mechanical derailments are the 3rd most lethal attack method. If we exclude two 
incidents involving multiple weapon combinations (one of which involves a derailment in 
Angola killing 259, and the other an attack in Cambodia killing 150), however, it becomes 
clear that mechanical derailments are in fact the most lethal passenger train attack method. 
If we look only at passenger trains with these same exclusions, and also exclude arson 
(heavily weighted by the 198 people killed by a suicidal arsonist in South Korea in 2003, 
and a single attack involving dynamite on a train in China in 1989), the same conclusion 
applies. Mechanical derailment is very lethal.
Looking more closely at bomb and mechanical derailments, several points need to be made. 
Mechanical derailments most typically involve removing tracks, sabotaging switches, or 
placing metal objects in the train’s path. Sixteen out of 53 mechanical sabotage attacks 
resulted in fatalities. Of the nine mechanical derailments that killed five or more persons, 
six took place in India, one in Pakistan, and one in Bangladesh. The three most lethal 
mechanical attacks took place in India. Indian train systems feature very crowded trains, 
which means that derailments are likely to cause heavy casualties, and sometimes it is not 
clear whether a mechanical derailment was a terrorist act or an accident. This may affect 
the high lethality seen in mechanical derailments.
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III. HOW MANY DERAILMENT ATTEMPTS  
ARE SUCCESSFUL?
This is a difficult question to answer with precision, but some estimates can be made. 
There are several approaches.
First, for bomb derailments it is possible to determine in how many cases a device or 
mechanical sabotage was detected beforehand, which is, of course, a failure if the intent is 
derailment rather than mere disruption. In 27 (or 10 percent) of the 282 attempts, a device 
was found or tampering with the tracks was discovered and the attack was prevented. In 
most cases, it is unclear who discovered the sabotage or found the explosive device, but 
in 18 (6.4%) of the attacks it is known who stopped the attack or found the bomb. These 
percentages are about the same as for attacks against all public surface transportation 
targets. For derailments, the action was taken by security officials or police in five attacks 
(1.8%), transit employees in five attacks (1.8%), members of the public in five attacks 
(1.8%), and drivers or crew in three attacks (1.1%).
We can also looked at the outcome of the bombs placed. Table 4 indicates that 279 devices 
were used in the 222 attacks involving bombs (often more than one device is used in a 
bomb attack). Of the 279 devices, 162 (58.1%) detonated at the right time and on target, 
while 116 (41.6%) failed to detonate, malfunctioned or detonated early, or were found and 
rendered safe. There is a difference, however, between detonating the bomb on target and 
on time, and a resulting derailment. The bomb may not have been placed properly, or the 
explosion was not powerful enough. Therefore it is incorrect to assume that in the 141 or 
exactly 50% of the attacks where at least one device detonated on time and on target, the 
train actually derailed. 
It is more difficult to determine the success rate of mechanical sabotage. Some acts of 
mechanical sabotage may be disguised to appear as maintenance flaws or employee 
errors. The reverse is also true—saboteurs may falsely claim responsibility for accidents. 
It is also difficult to determine whether terrorists face greater challenges derailing trains 
with explosive devices or employing mechanical means of sabotage. Explosive devices 
require knowledge and experience to build. Bombmakers are a precious commodity in 
terrorist organizations. The placement and timing of the detonation have to be precise. 
Even large quantities of explosives may not suffice to derail a train. Mechanical means 
also require a degree of knowledge, which not all attackers possess. Inside knowledge is 
especially valuable.
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Table 4. Outcome of Devices
Device Outcome Devices
% of 
Total Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Detonated or Released on Target 162 58.1% 532.0 3.3 0.0 3.3 1,699.8 10.5 1.0 10.5
EOD5 Successful, Rendered Safe 58 20.8% 7.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.2 0.0 0.0
Detonated Early or Away from Target, or Malfunctioned 53 19.0% 5.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Failed to Detonate or Release 5 1.8% 3.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 15.5 3.1 0.3 0.0
Unknown 1 0.4% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Devices 279 100% 547 2.0 0.0 3.4 1,737 6.2 0.0 10.7
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
5 EOD = Explosive ordinance disposal.
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We did review each derailment attempt and made a judgment as to whether the passenger 
train entirely, or at least in part, left the tracks—in other words, actually derailed (see Table 5). 
The findings are notable: the train derailed in 118 cases (41.8%), and in another 39 cases 
(13.8%) a bomb exploded but the train did not derail. By contrast, the derailment failed 
(usually because the timing was wrong or the device or mechanical sabotage simply did 
not work) in 92 cases (32.6%). In another 26 cases (9.2%), the derailment was prevented 
by employees, citizens, drivers or security officials or police who detected the attempt and 
stopped the train. The remaining seven cases (2.6%) involve instances where it was not 
clear whether a derailment occurred or not. 
Looking further at the rate of successful derailments only when bombs or mechanical means 
were used, we find that in the 222 attempts involving bombs, 76 or 34.2 percent resulted 
in actual derailments. In the remaining 60 instances where mechanical derailments were 
attempted, 42 or 70 percent resulted in derailments, a much higher percentage, recognizing 
however as mentioned previously, some accidents are claimed as derailments, and some 
terrorist derailments are claimed as accidents.
Table 5. Outcome of Derailment Attempts
Outcome # of Attempts % of Total
Derailed 118 41.8%
Derail Failed 92 32.6%
Derail Failed but Bomb Exploded near Train 39 13.8%
Derail Prevented 26 9.2%
Derail Unclear but Bomb Exploded near Train 7 2.5%
All Outcomes 282 100.0%
TRENDS OVER TIME
The 2010 study viewed time as flat—it did not explore trends over time. This new analysis 
does examine the derailment attempts over time to see what trends might be discernible. 
As Figure 1 shows, the rates of bomb-caused and mechanical (shortened in the graph to 
be “mech”) derailments have both increased over time, with bomb attacks showing the 
greater increase. Multiple weapon attacks (where a derailment is followed by an armed 
assault on the derailed train) have remained static and few in number.
Lethality, however, has increased only slightly (see Figure 2). The reason for a slight 
(rather than large) increase appears due mainly to the declining lethality of derailment 
attacks involving bombs, whereas the lethality of mechanical attacks appears to have 
increased significantly.
When considering lethality, the situation reverses, to a degree. Figure 4 traces overall 
fatality per attack (FPA) rates over time. Here we see that while lethality is declining for 
all other attacks on all passenger targets (trains, buses, ferries), and all other attacks on 
passenger train alone, lethality in derailment attacks alone is actually increasing slightly. 
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Attacks on tracks have a very low FPA, which remains low. We caution, however, that 
it may be that the declining FPAs merely reflect better reporting or that more low-level 
attacks are taking place now than in the 1970s and 1980s.
What this seems to be indicating is that while derailments are increasing, they are not 
increasing as fast as other groups of attacks. However, their lethality is increasing, albeit 
slightly, while the lethality of other attack methods is actually decreasing, a significant finding.
	
Figure 1. Derailment Attack Types Over Time
	
Figure 2. Derailment Lethality Over Time
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Figure 3. Comparison of Different Attacks on All Passenger Public Surface 
Transport Targets Over Time
	
Figure 4. Comparison of Different Attack Lethality on All Passenger Public  
Surface Transport Targets Over Time
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IV. TRACK ATTACKS—FREQUENT BUT NOT LETHAL
As already shown, the lethality of attacks on railway infrastructure is very low. These 
attacks are designed to disrupt, not to kill. Only 48 persons were killed and 268 injured in 
817 attacks. 
The targets that make up railway infrastructure are mostly railway tracks, bridges and 
tunnels, but they also include other targets, such as power, communications and signaling 
systems, service facilities and equipment, office buildings, construction sites, and others. 
Security personnel (typically guarding tracks) are also included in this category. Table 6 
shows how attacks are spread amongst the various targets. It is no surprise that the highest 
lethality is achieved when offices or construction sites are attacked, followed by attacks on 
rail security personnel, sometimes with bombs or incendiaries, and also with automatic or 
semi-automatic weapons. Although these incidents are included in the category of railway 
infrastructure, it is clear that sometimes the targets are people, not things.
Table 6. Track Attacks by Target
Target Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Railway Tracks 661 80.9% 22 0.0 0.0 193 0.3 0.0
Railway Bridge 57 7.0% 0 0.0 0.0 2 0.0 0.0
Railway Signals, 
Communications, or 
Power Systems
46 5.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Railway Personnel or 
Railway Company Office
14 1.7% 4 0.3 0.0 10 0.7 0.0
Train Service Facility or 
Equipment
11 1.3% 1 0.1 0.0 18 1.6 0.0
Construction Site 10 1.2% 15 1.5 0.0 33 3.3 0.5
Multiple Targets, Track 7 0.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Security Personnel 5 0.6% 5 1.0 0.0 11 2.2 1.0
Railway Tunnel 3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance or Inspection 
Train
2 0.2% 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
Other, Track 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Targets 817 100.0% 48 0.1 0.0 268 0.3 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Looking at the same attacks, Table 7 shows them broken down into four groups. Of the 817 
attacks, 721 (88.2%) are against railway tracks, bridges and tunnels; another 59 (7.2%) are 
against other rail infrastructure such as railway signals, communications or power systems; 
29 (3.5%) are against operating and security personnel and their facilities, and eight (1.0%) 
were against unspecified track targets. With the exception of attacks against security or 
operating personnel (where the average fatality per attack is 0.8), the rest of the attacks 
killed only 22 people, suggesting that the intent of these attacks was mainly disruption.
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Table 7. Track Attacks by Target Group
Target Group Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Railway Tracks, Bridges 
and Tunnels
721 88.2% 22 0.0 0.0 194.5 0.3 0.0
Other Railway 
Infrastructure
59 7.2% 2 0.0 0.0 19.0 0.3 0.0
Operating or Security 
Personnel and Facilities
29 3.5% 24 0.8 0.0 54.0 1.9 0.0
Unspecified 8 1.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Target Groups 817 100.0% 48 0.1 0.0 267.5 0.3 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Looking at attack methods (see Table 8), attacks involving explosive devices (IEDs, 
mines, grenades, dynamite, and other devices) predominate, accounting for 702 incidents 
or 85.9 percent of the attacks, followed by mechanical sabotage and arson. Mechanical 
sabotage—removing bolts and tracks—accounts for a mere 1.8 percent of the total number 
of infrastructure attacks or just 2.0 percent of the 721 attacks on railway tracks, tunnels 
and bridges. This contrasts with mechanical sabotage, accounting for 18.8 percent of the 
derailment attacks. It suggests that some cases of mechanical sabotage may go unreported 
as such unless they lead to a derailment. (It should be noted that there were two instances 
of a train derailment included in track attacks. However, these were attacks on maintenance 
or inspection trains and therefore are not counted as passenger train derailments).
The mechanical cases involved zero casualties, which is not surprising since the only 
way they would cause casualties is if they led to a derailment. The highest lethality was 
achieved in attacks involving automatic and semi-automatic weapons, explosives (including 
VBIEDs – Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices), and RPGs (Rocket-Propelled 
Grenades) deliberately directed at human targets—construction crews, company officials, 
and security personnel.
Table 8. Track Attacks by Weapon and Method of Attack
Attack and Weapon Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA
Median 
IPA
IED, Unspecified 669 81.9% 28 0.0 0.0 218 0.3 0.0
Sabotage, Other 41 5.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Arson 22 2.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
IID (Improvised Incendiary 
Device)
17 2.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Bolts/Tracks Removed 15 1.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Grenade 7 0.9% 0 0.0 0.0 5 0.7 0.0
Mine 7 0.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Dynamite 6 0.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
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Attack and Weapon Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA
Median 
IPA
Assault, Automatic or 
Semi-Automatic 
Weapons
5 0.6% 16 3.2 1.0 17 3.4 1.0
IED, Hoax Device 4 0.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Assault, Unspecified or 
Other
3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 5 1.7 0.0
Kidnapping 3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Multiple Weapons, IED/IID 
& Other
3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Unknown 3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Track 
Bomb-IED, Unspecified
2 0.2% 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
IED, Other 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Multiple Weapons, IED/IID 
& Automatic or Semi-
Automatic Weapons
2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Armed Robbery 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Assault, RPG 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 2 2.0 2.0
Assault, Stabbings 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 14 14.0 14.0
IED, Bicycle-Borne 1 0.1% 3 3.0 3.0 6 6.0 6.0
Mortar 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
VBIED3 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Attacks and Weapons 817 100.0% 48 0.1 0.0 268 0.3 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
3 VBIED = Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device.
There seems to be some correlation between where derailment attacks take place and 
where track attacks take place, as can be seen in Table 9 for regions, followed by Table 10 
for countries. Again, Western Europe comes in second in terms of the volume of track 
attacks, but there are no fatalities and only a few injuries associated with these. The volume 
of attacks owes mainly to the terrorist campaigns of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 
the United Kingdom and the Basque separatists in Spain.4 Both campaigns against rail 
targets were largely disruptive rather than intended to cause heavy casualties. There is no 
meaningful difference in lethality between regions, which is low overall.
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Table 9. Track Attacks by Region
Region Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
South Asia 482 59.0% 23 0.0 0.0 118 0.2 0.0
Western Europe 126 15.4% 0 0.0 0.0 3 0.0 0.0
Russia and the NIS 71 8.7% 13 0.2 0.0 77 1.1 0.0
Southeast Asia 40 4.9% 7 0.2 0.0 26 0.7 0.0
Middle East and North 
Africa
31 3.8% 4 0.1 0.0 27 0.9 0.0
North America 21 2.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
South America 19 2.3% 0 0.0 0.0 2 0.1 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 11 1.3% 1 0.1 0.0 15 1.4 0.0
East Asia 9 1.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Eastern Europe 5 0.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Central Asia 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Regions 817 100.0% 48 0.1 0.0 268 0.3 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
As seen in Table 10, Pakistan and India trade first and second place in terms of their overall 
share of total attacks, but together account for 57.6 percent of the railway infrastructure 
attacks as opposed to 52.5 percent of the derailment attacks. The United Kingdom replaces 
Russia for third place.
Table 10. Track Attacks by Country
Country Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA
Median 
IPA
Pakistan 262 32.1% 6 0.0 0.0 63 0.2 0.0
India 208 25.5% 17 0.1 0.0 55 0.3 0.0
United Kingdom 41 5.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Russian Federation 37 4.5% 13 0.4 0.0 77 2.1 0.0
Thailand 34 4.2% 7 0.2 0.0 25 0.7 0.0
Italy 29 3.5% 0 0.0 0.0 3 0.1 0.0
Ukraine 28 3.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Spain 26 3.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Germany 19 2.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
United States 19 2.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Egypt 13 1.6% 1 0.1 0.0 7 0.5 0.0
Colombia 12 1.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Japan 9 1.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
South Africa 6 0.7% 1 0.2 0.0 1 0.2 0.0
Sri Lanka 6 0.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Turkey 6 0.7% 2 0.3 0.0 20 3.3 0.5
Algeria 5 0.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
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Country Attacks
% 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA
Median 
IPA
Georgia 5 0.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Bangladesh 4 0.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
France 4 0.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Iraq 3 0.4% 1 0.3 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Kosovo 3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Syria 3 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Argentina 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Cambodia 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Chile 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.5 0.5
Czech Republic 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Ethiopia 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Myanmar 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Nepal 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Peru 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.5 0.5
Austria 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Belgium 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Brazil 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Canada 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Greece 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Israel 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 14 14.0 14.0
Lithuania 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 1 1.0 1.0
Switzerland 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Tajikistan 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Uzbekistan 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Zambia 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Zimbabwe 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Countries 817 100.0% 48 0.1 0.0 268 0.3 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
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Table 11 shows the delivery and concealment method for explosive or incendiary devices, with 91.8 percent of the devices placed 
on railroad tracks, a bridge or a tunnel.
Table 11. Track Attacks by Bomb Delivery Method
Concealment and Delivery Method Devices
% of Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Placed on Railroad Track or Bridge, or Near 
a Train
958 91.8% 17 0.0 0.0 0.0 129 0.1 0.0 0.2
Placed Near Target, Unspecified 57 5.5% 12 0.2 0.0 0.2 90 1.6 0.0 1.8
Physically Thrown 9 0.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0.2 0.0 0.3
Concealed/Placed inside of Building or 
Office
6 0.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.2 0.0 0.2
Concealed/Placed inside Station, 
Unspecified or Other
4 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unknown 4 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Concealed/Placed outside of Building or 
Office
3 0.3% 3 1.0 0.0 1.0 6 2.0 0.0 2.0
Vehicle Placed Near Target 2 0.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Concealed/Placed in Non-Pax 
Compartment
1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 2.0 2.0 2.0
All Cotainment and Delivery Methods 1,044 100.0% 32 0.0 0.0 0.0 230 0.2 0.0 0.3
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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How successful were the saboteurs? As Table 12 indicates, 71.3 percent of their devices detonated on target. Another 1.9 percent 
failed to detonate, were improperly placed, or malfunctioned. Interestingly, 26.0 percent of the devices were found and rendered 
safe while another 0.7 percent were detonated during unsuccessful attempts to disarm them. This means that 26.7 percent of the 
devices were discovered before they were supposed to explode. This is a remarkable number and merits closer examination. 
Table 12. Track Attacks by Bomb Outcome
Device Outcome Devices
% of Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Detonated or Released on Target 744 71.3% 28 0.0 0.0 0.0 217 0.3 0.0 0.3
EOD Successful, Rendered Safe 271 26.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Detonated Early or Away from Target, 
or Malfunctioned
10 1.0% 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Failed to Detonate or Release 9 0.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Detonated during Unsuccessful EOD 7 0.7% 3 0.4 0.0 0.0 5 0.7 0.3 0.0
Unknown 3 0.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Device Outcomes 1,044 100.0% 32 0.03 0.0 0.0 230 0.2 0.0 0.3
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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Another way of looking at devices is to see how many were found before they detonated. As Table 13 indicates, the attackers 
provided warnings to the authorities in only 0.4 percent of the total number of devices cases, while intelligence efforts led to just 
another 0.1 percent of the devices being located and rendered safe (although we only know of cases in which intelligence are 
reported to be involved—there may be more). Police, military personnel, other security officials, drivers, crew, and other employees, 
passengers and ordinary citizens were responsible for finding 96 (or 9.2 percent) of the devices. The circumstances are unknown 
in 13.5 percent of the cases. Looking at only devices detected before an attack took place, 238 or 23% of the total were detected, 
which is about 7 percent higher than the average for all public surface transportation targets combined (15.6%) and about eight 
percent higher than for all attacks against all passenger targets (14.4%).
Table 13. Track Bombs Detected Before Attacks
Devices Detected Before Attacks Devices
% of Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Not Detected 715 68.5% 31 0.0 0.0 0.0 214 0.3 0.0 0.3
Unknown 141 13.5% 1 0.0 0.0 0.3 3 0.0 0.0 0.8
EOD after Some Devices Detonated in Attack 86 8.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9 0.1 0.0 0.2
Police 31 3.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Security Officials 26 2.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0.1 0.0 1.0
Transit Employees 14 1.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Citizens 13 1.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Attacker Warning to Authorities 4 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Driver or Crew 4 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Military 4 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Passengers 3 0.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Combination 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EOD after No Device Detonated in Attack 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Intelligence 1 0.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Devices Detected Before Attacks 1,044 100.0% 32 0.0 0.0 0.0 230 0.2 0.0 0.3
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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V. ANALYSIS OF FOUR DIFFERENT GROUPS USING 
DERAILMENT AND TRACK ATTACKS
Treating all attacks as a single universe can be misleading. It portrays all of the perpetrators 
as a single generic adversary. The MTI database confirms that diverse individuals 
and groups have carried out track attacks and attempted to derail trains, including the 
Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom, neofascists in Italy, Marxist guerrillas in 
Colombia, anarchists, environmental extremists, extortionists, and mentally disturbed 
individuals in Europe and elsewhere. Many attacks are one-offs. Others are part of long-
running campaigns of sabotage. This section examines the derailment and track attacks 
by four sets of adversaries who have such campaigns, some long-running: first, the least 
lethal group -- an assemblage of European anarchists and environmental extremists; next, 
Maoist, sometimes referred to Naxalite, guerrillas in India; third, Islamic separatists in 
southern Thailand; finally, operatives motivated by jihadist ideology—by far the most lethal 
group. These groups illustrate significant differences in motives, objectives, and modes of 
operating. This shows up vividly in a comparison of both the frequency and the lethality of 
their attacks, which will be shown in Tables 14 and 15.
First, however, some caveats are in order. Together, the attacks carried out by the four 
groupings reviewed here comprise 57 (24%) of the 282 attempted derailments, and 209 
(26%) of the 817 attacks against rail infrastructure recorded in the MTI database between 
1970 and the end of 2017. While the Internet has improved access to information about 
incidents that occur, no claim can be made that all attacks are captured. This is truer of 
derailments and rail infrastructure attacks conducted using mechanical sabotage, rather 
than those that involve bombings, which may be more widely covered in the media. It 
is especially true if there were few if any fatalities, particularly in developing countries. 
In some developing countries there may be an effort to minimize the particular terrorist 
threats, leading some governments, such as India, to downplay public reporting of the 
actual number of incidents. At the same time, there are also reports that in these same 
countries, railroad officials may blame saboteurs for derailments or track problems that 
were due to poor maintenance. 
The MTI database deliberately excludes incidents that occur in war zones during active 
military hostilities. We monitor these conflicts, but exclude them from the statistical analysis. 
This decision reflects a concern that the high volumes of all forms of violence connected 
with the war would distort the data and lead to conclusions that would not be relevant 
to transportation operators or authorities charged with security in the rest of the world. 
Obviously, judgments may vary as to what counts as a war zone. We exclude events in 
Afghanistan, but not in Pakistan. Finally, we require a high level of confidence in attributing 
attacks to specific adversaries—there is either a credible claim or enough evidence to 
reasonably surmise that a specific group was responsible. That means some incidents, 
which may be the work of the four groups examined here, are omitted. 
As a result of these limitations, the numbers presented below should be seen as illustrative 
of the activity rather than representing the entire universe of actions. 
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As indicated in Table 14 below—which includes derailment-only attacks—India’s Maoist 
guerrillas have carried out the most attacks. In addition to the 37 derailment attacks 
known (32) or presumed (five) to have been the work of the Maoists, the MTI database 
records another 45 derailment attacks in India. Some of these are attributable to other 
groups such as separatists in Assam or Bodoland, but in some cases no certain attribution 
was possible, and some of these may have been carried out by Maoist guerrillas. Also, 
Jihadists are identified as the perpetrators in 10 derailment attacks but may in fact be 
responsible for some of the other non-attributed attacks in Pakistan, where there have 
been 66 derailment attacks. 
Similarly, some of the attacks in Russia may fall into the jihadist category. Russia’s Chechen 
rebels initially were categorized as separatists. Over time, the guerrillas who continued 
to operate in the Caucuses became increasingly dominated by jihadist extremists. It is 
difficult to attribute a precise date to what was an evolutionary development. Somewhat 
arbitrarily, we have chosen to include under the jihadist label only those attacks in Russia 
since October, 2009.
Table 14. Derailment Attacks by Attacker Type – Frequency
Attacker Type - 
Derailment Attacks Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
All Other Groups 213 75.5% 651 3.1 0.0 2,145 10.1 0.0
Maoist 37 13.1% 199 5.4 0.0 443 12.0 0.0
Jihadist 10 3.5% 208 20.8 0.0 320 32.0 0.0
Thai Islamic Separatists 10 3.5% 4 0.4 0.0 71 7.1 0.5
Criminal 8 2.8% 6 0.8 0.0 55 6.9 0.0
Unknown 3 1.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Mentally Disordered 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 12 12.0 12.0
All Attacker Types - 
Derailment Attacks
282 100.0% 1,068 3.8 0.0 3,046 10.8 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Table 15 on derailment attacks ranks the attacker types by lethality rather than frequency, 
and shows that jihadists are clearly the most lethal of the groupings, followed by India’s 
Maoist guerrillas, with Thailand’s Islamic separatists in third place. Europe’s anarchists and 
environmental extremists do not appear in these charts because they have not attempted 
any derailments.
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Table 15. Derailment Attacks by Attacker Type – Lethality
Attacker Type - 
Derailment Attacks Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Jihadist 10 3.5% 208 20.8 0.0 320 32.0 0.0
Maoist 37 13.1% 199 5.4 0.0 443 12.0 0.0
All Other Groups 213 75.5% 651 3.1 0.0 2,145 10.1 0.0
Criminal 8 2.8% 6 0.8 0.0 55 6.9 0.0
Thai Islamic Separatists 10 3.5% 4 0.4 0.0 71 7.1 0.5
Unknown 3 1.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Mentally Disordered 1 0.4% 0 0.0 0.0 12 12.0 12.0
All Attacker Types - 
Derailment Attacks
282 100.0% 1,068 3.8 0.0 3,046 10.8 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
We can take another look at the relative lethality of the groups we have examined by 
looking only at derailment attacks (since lethality in track attacks is almost always zero 
or extremely low), and comparing them only to each other and to their combined total. As 
Table 16 illustrates, the jihadists (with an average FPA of 20.8) are 3.9 times more lethal 
than the next most lethal group, the Maoists (with an average lethality of 5.4 FPA), and the 
jihadists are nearly three times more lethal than the overall average of 7.2 when looking 
only at these groups.
Table 16. Comparison of Derailment Lethality for Three Groups
Derailment Attacks for 3 
Groups Derailing Trains Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Jihadist 10 3.5% 208 20.8 0.0 320 32.0 0.0
Maoist 37 13.1% 199 5.4 0.0 443 12.0 0.0
Thai Islamic Separatists 10 3.5% 4 0.4 0.0 71 7.1 0.5
All Derailment Attacks 
for 5 Groups Derailing 
Trains
57 100.0% 411 7.2 0.0 834 14.6 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Table 17 shows only track attacks. Since lethality is very low for all groups, we only 
show frequencies. Of the four groups we examined, India’s Maoist guerrillas lead with 
the most (135) attacks, followed by Thailand’s Islamic separatists, Europe’s anarchists 
and environmental extremists, and then jihadists. Combining derailment attempts and 
track attacks shows the intensity of the operations of these four groupings. India’s Maoist 
guerrillas have been responsible for 135 track attacks and 37 attempted derailments, 
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for a total of 172 incidents, and perhaps more. Thailand’s Islamic separatists have been 
responsible for 34 track attacks and 10 derailments, a total of 44 incidents. The European 
grouping carried out 33 track attacks. Once again, the lethality of the track attacks was 
very low for all of the groups. 
Table 17. Track Attacks by Frequency
Attacker Type - 
Track Attacks Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
All Other Groups 571 69.9% 38 0.1 0.0 232 0.4 0.0
Maoist 135 16.5% 0 0.0 0.0 8 0.1 0.0
Thai Islamic Separatists 34 4.2% 7 0.2 0.0 25 0.7 0.0
European Anarchist 
Environmental
33 4.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Unknown 16 2.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Criminal 11 1.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Tribal 10 1.2% 2 0.2 0.0 2 0.2 0.0
Jihadist 7 0.9% 1 0.1 0.0 1 0.1 0.0
All Attacker Types - 
Track Attacks
817 100.0% 48 0.1 0.0 268 0.3 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMISTS AND ANARCHISTS IN EUROPE
This is not a single group waging an ongoing campaign, but rather an assemblage of 
groups pursuing their own agendas. As seen in Figure 5, left-wing groups and anarchists 
along with various environmentalist and issue-oriented extremists have been responsible 
for a number of track attacks and other acts of sabotage in Europe, especially since 1996. 
Antinuclear extremists were involved or suspected of involvement in six of the attacks. The 
“Hekla Reception Committee—Initiative for More Social Eruptions,” a left-wing group in 
Germany named after a volcano in Iceland, protesting the participation of German troops 
in Afghanistan, claimed responsibility for as many as seven track attacks in the database. 
These are part of a campaign of attacks using improvised incendiary devices (IIDs— 
17 used in all) against communication and switching systems in the German railway 
system, including inside stations. Groups protesting high-speed rail lines, such as the 
NO-TAV (Treni di Alta Velocita) in Italy, are responsible for eight of the 33 attacks. The other 
12 attacks were carried out by a variety of informal anarchist or environmental activists. 
The number of all incidents peaked in 2011, which saw eight attacks. 
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Figure 5. European Anarchist/Environmental Attacks Over Time
Most of the attacks occurred in Germany (45 percent of the attacks), Italy (39 percent 
of the attacks), the United Kingdom (9 percent of the attacks), followed by France (with 
the remaining 6 percent). In a few instances, it appears that anarchist cells in France, 
Belgium, Germany, and Italy were trying to coordinate their attacks across the continent.
According to Table 18, the attackers rarely used explosives (only one attack), and instead 
relied heavily on mechanical sabotage (45%) and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) 
(42%). While worldwide IIDs such as petrol bombs are usually thrown, all here were placed 
near the intended target. In a number of cases where the rail system runs on overhead 
electricity, the perpetrators attached hooked metal bars to high-voltage electricity lines—a 
passing locomotive would snag the bar, thereby ripping up the power lines. The attackers 
also cut cables or tampered with switches. 
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Table 18. European Environmental or Anarchist Attacks by Weapon
Attacker Type - 
Track Attacks Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Sabotage, Other 15 45.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
IID (Improvised Incendiary 
Device)
14 42.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Arson 2 6.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
IED, Hoax Device 1 3.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
IED, Unspecified 1 3.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Attacker Types - 
Track Atatcks
33 100.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Overall, 55 percent of the attacks were directed at railway signaling, power and 
communications systems, and 30 percent at railway tracks or railway tunnels (see 
Table 19). There were also two attacks against construction sites for high-speed rail projects. 
Table 19. European Environmental or Anarchist Attacks by Target
Attacker Type - 
Track Attacks Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Railway Signals, Comm. 
or Power Systems
18 55.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Railway Tracks 9 27.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Construction Site 2 6.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Multiple Targets, Track 2 6.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Other, Track 1 3.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Railway Tunnel 1 3.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Attacker Types - 
Track Attacks
33 100.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Only 25 devices (64 percent of the total) are known or presumed to have detonated or 
initiated on target. That is considerably less that the average rate of success (77 percent) 
for all attacks on passenger targets. Other devices were discovered or failed to detonate; 
36 percent were detected before the attack, which is more than twice as high as for all 
passenger attacks (15%). The higher failure and higher detection rate suggest adversaries 
with limited operational capabilities, which may be true, but it may also be that security is 
better, or that some of the devices were put in obvious places and intended to be found 
merely to add to the overall disruption.
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None of these attacks resulted in fatalities or injuries. That is not the intent. The attackers 
instead sought to attract publicity, cause damage, inconvenience and widespread disruption, 
and impose heavy economic costs on society. In November 2008, for example, anarchists 
targeting four rail lines caused the delay of nearly 160 high-speed trains, including the 
Eurostar service between Paris and London, leaving thousands of passengers stranded.
THE ISLAMIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTHERN THAILAND
The current insurgency in southern Thailand began as a separatist guerrilla movement in 
the 1940s, although the origins of the dispute reach back into the 18th century when the 
Muslim majority southern provinces of Thailand were part of the independent Sultanate 
of Patani, which was conquered by Kingdom of Siam in 1785. Rebellions continued in the 
19th century. Resistance flared again in the early 20th century in reaction to a concerted 
assimilation effort by the government in Bangkok. In the 1960s, the resistance adopted 
the then current leftist leanings and language of a national liberation front, calling itself the 
Patani National Liberation Front. The insurgency subsided in the 1980s, but surged again 
at the beginning of the 21st century. Changing its name in 1986 to the Islamic Liberation 
Front of Patani, its ideology has also become less nationalistic and more militantly Islamist. 
(The change from Marxist to Islamist rhetoric may reflect how persistent local conflicts 
with deep historical roots reflect, adapt, and connect themselves with broader worldwide 
movements.) Although the violence began to escalate in 2001, most sources date the 
current insurgency from 2004. 
There is no single insurgent organization, but rather a host of political entities and armed 
formations separated by degrees of commitment to hardline Salafi Islamist beliefs. Estimates 
of the total number of insurgents vary widely from hundreds to more than 10,000.5
The attacks on rail lines and trains are a minor component of the armed struggle in which 
nearly 7,000 people have died since 2004 (see Figure 6). The killing reached a peak of 
more than 700 deaths in 2006, subsided somewhat, but then resurged in 2011, which saw 
more than 500 deaths. The violence has become more indiscriminate, with insurgents 
setting off bombs in public areas.
Attacks on the rail system roughly reflect the overall trajectory of violence. The first attacks 
occur in 1993 and then peak in the 2004 to 2007 period with 19 attacks. Attacks against 
railway infrastructure have increased more than derailment attempts (see Figure 6). As in 
other case studies, the lethality of the infrastructure attacks remains very low, while the 
lethality of the derailment attacks has increased slightly (see Figure 7).
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Figure 6. Thai Islamic Separatist Attacks Over Time
	
Figure 7. Thai Islamic Separatist Lethality Over Time
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Looking at the attacks by target (see Table 20) shows that most of the attacks (28 or 63.6%) 
were directed against railway tracks and bridges; four attacks were directed at security 
personnel guarding railway tracks; and two attacks were against railway service facilities 
or equipment. There were 10 attempts to derail passenger trains. Few were successful, 
and only four people were killed in the derailment attempts and another seven in the track 
attacks. Comparing these low casualties to the total volume of violence in the insurgency 
suggests that the insurgents’ campaign against the rail system is a low-level sideshow 
intended to be primarily disruptive and divert government forces to rail protection duties. 
The fact that local residents comprise the bulk of the passengers may also constrain the 
adversaries. Attacking other targets may allow the separatists to be more discriminate.
Table 20. Thai Islamic Separatist Attacks by Target
Target Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Railway Tracks 24 54.5% 2 0.1 0.0 6 0.3 0.0
Railway Bridge 4 9.1% 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.3 0.0
Security Personnel 4 9.1% 5 1.3 1.0 9 2.3 0.5
Train Service Facility or 
Equipment
2 4.5% 0 0.0 0.0 9 4.5 4.5
All Track Attacks 34 77.3% 7 0.2 0.0 25 0.7 0.0
Train, Passenger 
(Intercity or Commuter) 
Targets
10 22.7% 4 0.4 0.0 71 7.1 0.5
All Targets 44 100.0% 11 0.3 0.0 96 2.2 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
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As Table 21 shows, explosives predominate. IEDs account for five of the 10 derailment 
attempts and 25 of the 34 track attacks, although one has to suspect that there are many 
more unreported instances of mechanical sabotage. (There was also one attack in which 
a bomb derailed a train, followed by an attack with automatic weapons, killing three.)
Table 21. Thai Islamic Separatist Attacks by Attack Method
Attack Method Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
IED, Unspecified 25 56.8% 7 0.3 0.0 16 0.6 0.0
Derailment, Track 
Bomb-IED, Unspecified
5 11.4% 0 0.0 0.0 4 0.8 0.0
Bolts/Tracks Removed 4 9.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Bolts/Tracks 
Removed
4 9.1% 1 0.3 0.0 31 7.8 6.5
Sabotage, Other 4 9.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Assault, Automatic or Semi-
Automatic Weapons
1 2.3% 0 0.0 0.0 9 9.0 9.0
Derailment, Multiple 
Weapons-IED & Assault 
with Automatic or Semi-
Automatic Weapons
1 2.3% 3 3.0 3.0 36 36.0 36.0
All Track Attacks Total/ 
Average/Median
34 100.0% 7 0.2 0.0 25 0.7 0.0
All Derailment Attacks 
Total/Average/Median
10 100.0% 4 0.4 0.0 71 7.1 0.5
All Attack Methods 44 100.0% 11 0.3 0.0 96 2.2 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
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Looking only at attacks using explosive or incendiary devices, 97% of the 34 devices were placed on railroad tracks. Only single 
devices were used, making the count of devices the same as the count of attacks. As Table 22 shows, of these, 28 (or 82.4 percent) 
detonated on target. The remaining six devices (or 17.6 percent) were discovered and rendered safe or, in one case, detonated 
during disarmament.
Table 22. Thai Separatist Bombs by Outcome
Device Outcome Devices
% of 
Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Detonated or Released on Target 28 82.4% 5 0.2 0.0 0.2 15 0.5 0.0 0.5
EOD Successful, Rendered Safe 5 14.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Detonated Early or Away from Target, or Malfunctioned 1 2.9% 2 2.0 2.0 0.0 1 1.0 1.0 0.0
All Device Outcomes 34 100.0% 7 0.2 0.0 0.3 16 0.5 0.0 0.6
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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The high percentage of bombs detonated on target suggests that the attackers know how 
to make and place bombs that work. The low number of casualties, therefore, may reflect 
self-imposed constraints, not lack of competence.
THE NAXALITE-MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA
The Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in India began in 1967 as an armed movement aimed 
at overthrowing the Indian state and replacing it with a Communist regime. It traces its 
origins to schisms in the Indian Communist movement and emergence of more militant 
Maoist factions in the 1960s. The Maoists are often called Naxalites after the village 
Naxalbari in West Bengal where the Maoists initiated their armed struggle. The insurgency 
found strength among the marginalized tribal people and poorest peasants. In response 
to the growing violence, India mounted a massive counterinsurgency effort in 1971 that 
suppressed but did not eliminate the movement. The violence never entirely subsided 
and the insurgency escalated again at the beginning of the 21st century. The beginning 
of the current rebellion is put at 2004 when the insurgents reorganized themselves as 
the Communist Party of India (Maoist), with its armed wing called the People’s Liberation 
Guerrilla Army, which is estimated to have 8-10,000 members. 
The insurgency spread across the country with insurgent attacks taking place in nearly half 
of India’s states, but it remains strongest in India’s so-called “red corridor” of Jharkand, 
West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Chhattisgarhm Madhya Pradesh, and Andra Pradesh. These 
are among the poorest, least developed parts of India with high populations of tribal people 
and sharp caste divisions. The Maoists claim they are fighting on behalf of neglected, 
displaced and impoverished populations.6 
As illustrated in Figure 8, the insurgency expanded, steadily achieving its largest area of 
influence roughly between 2009 and 2012. In 2011, there were a reported 1,760 incidents. 
Casualties climbed from 1996 on, reaching a high point in 2010 with more than 1,100 
fatalities. Depending on whether one counts from 1996 or 1980, the total death toll of the 
insurgency lies somewhere between 12,000 and 20,000. Civilians account for a majority of 
the casualties. Government development programs and counterinsurgency operations have 
reduced the area affected and total casualties in recent years, but the conflict continues.
In compiling the following figures, we have included all of the attacks claimed by the 
Maoists. The data also include attacks in the states affected by the insurgency that were not 
attributed to other groups on the reasonable assumption that they were Maoist, because 
there are no other groups operating in these areas. This brings the total number of Maoist 
attacks against train and railway targets during the period covered to 244 (or 43 percent) 
of the 564 attacks recorded in India. Narrowing the inquiry to include only derailment 
attempts and attacks on rail infrastructure gives a total of 290 attacks, of which 172 (or 
59 percent) were carried out by Maoists.
As seen in Figure 8, the first recorded attack occurs in 1989, but the surge in activity 
begins in 1991, reaching a high point in 2007 with 20 attacks, and again in 2010 with 
24 attacks. From 2007 to 2016, there were 142 attacks. This corresponds roughly with the 
high point of insurgency activity overall. 
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As seen in the other case studies, Figure 9 shows that the lethality of track attacks remains 
very low. However, in contrast to the worldwide trend, the lethality of derailment attacks 
has increased. This may reflect a single spectacular incident.
The lethality follows a familiar pattern. Lethality for derailments is going up, while the 
lethality of track attacks, designed to create disruption and not loss of life, remains low.
	
Figure 8. Maoist Attacks Over Time
	
Figure 9. Lethality of Maoist Attacks Over Time
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As for targets, Table 23 shows that 135 out of the 172 attacks (or 78 percent) are against 
railway infrastructure. A majority of these attacks—126 (or 73.3 percent) were directed 
against the tracks or bridges, with the remainder targeting construction sites, signals, 
communications and power systems, equipment and facilities, or other targets. These 
attacks on infrastructure generated no deaths or injuries, and probably were intended 
to support a campaign of disruption and economic warfare while diverting government 
counterinsurgent forces to security functions. As for the derailments, all 37 attacks 
(22 percent of the total) were aimed at intercity passenger or commuter trains. Of these 
attacks, only five were lethal, but the worst—a derailment, which killed 114 people in 2010 
through mechanical sabotage—drove the lethality rate or FPA for all derailments upwards.
Table 23. Maoist Attacks by Target
Target Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Railway Tracks 125 72.7% 0 0.0 0.0 8 0.1 0.0
Train, Passenger 
(Intercity or Commuter)
37 21.5% 199 5.4 0.0 443 12.0 0.0
Railway Personnel or 
Railway Company 
Office
3 1.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Multiple Targets, Track 2 1.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Train Service Facility or 
Equipment
2 1.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Construction Site 1 0.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Railway Bridge 1 0.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Railway Signals, Comm. 
or Power Systems
1 0.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Track Target Attacks 135 78.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Derailment Target 
Attacks
37 22.0% 199 5.4 0.0 443 12.0 0.0
All Targets 172 100.0% 199 1.2 0.0 451 2.6 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
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Because the number of attacks is larger than in the other sets examined, the attack 
methods shown in Table 24 are broken out into three separate sets of targets: (1) intercity 
passenger and commuter trains, which were the targets of 37 attacks with all of the 
fatalities coming from mechanical derailments; (2) railway tracks, tunnels and bridges; 
(3) other railway infrastructure such as serving equipment or facilities; and (4) operational 
and security personnel.
Table 24. Maoist Attacks by Target Group
Target Group Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Railway Tracks, Bridges 
and Tunnels
126 73.3% 0 0.0 0.0 8 0.1 0.0
Passenger Trains 37 21.5% 199 5.4 0.0 443 12.0 0.0
Operating or Security 
Personnel and Facilities
4 2.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Other Railway 
Infrastructure
3 1.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Unspecified 2 1.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Target Groups 172 100.0% 199 1.2 0.0 451 2.6 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
In the following three tables we look at the attack methods used (Tables 25, 26 and 27). 
Table 25 looks only at attack derailments. Explosives predominate, but mechanical methods 
proved more lethal.
Table 25. Maoist Attacks – Train Derailments Only
Atttack and Weapon 
(Derailment) Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Derailment, Track 
Bomb-IED, Unspecified
20 54.1% 6 0.3 0.0 61 3.1 0.0
Derailment, Bolts/Tracks 
Removed
11 29.7% 193 17.5 0.0 382 34.7 0.0
Derailment, Other or 
Unknown
3 8.1% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Track 
Bomb-Dynamite
2 5.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Track 
Bomb-Mine
1 2.7% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Attacks and Weapons 37 100.0% 199 5.4 0.0 443 12.0 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
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Table 26 examines the methods of attack on railway tracks, tunnels, and bridges. Explosives 
play an even greater role, but, as indicated before, there are zero casualties.
Table 26. Maoist Attacks on Railway Tracks, Bridges and Tunnels
Attack and Weapon 
(Railway Tracks, 
Bridges, and Tunnels) Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
IED, Unspecified 105 83.3% 0 0.0 0.0 8 0.1 0.0
Bolts/Tracks Removed 6 4.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Mine 4 3.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Multiple Weapons, IED/IID 
& Other
2 1.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Sabotage, Other 2 1.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Unknown 2 1.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Assault, Unspecified or 
Other
1 0.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Dynamite 1 0.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Grenade 1 0.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Multiple Weapons, IED/IID 
& Automatic or Semi-
Automatic Weapons
1 0.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
VBIED3 1 0.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Attacks and Weapons 
(Railway Tracks, 
Bridges, and Tunnels)
126 100.0% 0 0.0 0.0 8 0.0 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
3 VBIED = Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device.
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Table 27 looks only at attacks on other infrastructure (such as signaling systems) and on 
operating and security personnel and the facilities they use, which is why kidnapping is 
included. The attack methods vary, but even here there were no fatalities.
Table 27. Maoist Attacks on Other Infrastructure Targets
Attack and Weapon (Other 
Railway Infrastructure 
and Operating and Se-
curity Personnel) Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Arson 2 28.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Kidnapping 2 28.6% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Assault, Unspecified or 
Other
1 14.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
IED, Unspecified 1 14.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Multiple Weapons, IED/IID 
& Automatic or Semi- 
Automatic Weapons
1 14.3% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Attacks and Weapons 
(Other Railway 
Infrastructure and 
Operating and Security 
Personnel)
7 100.0% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
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Table 28 turns to the 222 devices used in the 172 attacks in terms of method of delivery and placement. It appears that 97 percent 
of the devices were placed on the tracks.
Table 28. Maoist Devices by Concealment and Delivery Method
Concealment and Delivery Outcome Devices
% of 
Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Placed on Railroad Track or Bridge, or Near a Train 215 96.8% 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 69 0.3 0.0 0.5
Placed Near Target, Unspecified 3 1.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vehicle Placed Near Target 2 0.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Concealed/Placed inside Station, Unspecified or Other 1 0.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Concealed/Placed outside of Building or Office 1 0.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Concealment and Delivery Outcomes 222 100.0% 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 69 0.3 0 0.5
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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Turning to what happened to these same devices, Table 29 shows that 68 percent exploded on target, while an unusually high 
number (27 percent) were discovered and rendered safe, suggesting high security awareness. The remainder malfunctioned or 
detonated too early. 
Table 29. Maoist Devices by Outcome
Device Outcome Devices
% of 
Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Detonated or Released on Target 150 67.6% 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 63 0.4 0.0 0.4
EOD Successful, Rendered Safe 61 27.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 0.1 0.0 0.0
Detonated Early or Away from Target, 
or Malfunctioned
7 3.2% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Detonated during Unsuccessful EOD 4 1.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.2 0.2 0.0
All Device Outcomes 222 100.0% 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 69 0.3 0.0 0.5
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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Finally, Table 30 shows how many of these devices were found, where we see that 22% were actually detected before an attack by 
alert drivers, crew and transit employees, the public, and by police and security officials, which is a robust percentage compared to 
other sets of attacks. Another 14% were detected in the course of investigations following explosions, indicating that the attackers 
planted multiple devices. The detected devices resulted in no fatalities and possibly were intended to slow down repair and 
recovery operations.
Table 30. Maoist Devices Detected
Devices Detected Before Attacks Devices
% of 
Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
Not Detected 142 64.0% 6 0.0 0 0.0 62 0.4 0.0 0.5
EOD after Some Devices Detonated in Attack 31 14.0% 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.1 0.0 0.3
Unknown 20 9.0% 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Driver or Crew 8 3.6% 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Citizens 6 2.7% 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.3 0.3 0.0
Police 6 2.7% 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Security Officials 5 2.3% 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.4 0.5 0.0
Transit Employees 4 1.8% 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Devices Detected Before Attacks 222 100.0% 6 0.0 0 0.0 69 0.3 0.0 0.5
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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JIHADIST ATTACKS WORLDWIDE
The armed struggle inspired by the ideology of groups like al Qaeda and ISIS is a global 
enterprise. In addition to preparing centrally directed attacks and assisting foreign recruits 
to return and carry out attacks in their countries of origin, jihadist groups and their affiliates 
also urge followers abroad to carry out attacks wherever they are using whatever means 
they can. Surface transportation targets figure prominently in jihadist plots and attacks.7 
Many of these have been directed against passengers on subways or commuter trains or 
at train stations. The terrorist bombings of commuter trains in Madrid in 2004, the bombing 
of London Transport in 2005, the bombing of a commuter train in Mumbai in 2006, and the 
bombing of the Metro in Brussels in 2016 are some of the more dramatic examples. These 
attacks were aimed at causing mass casualties—the four attacks mentioned killed nearly 
500 people and injured more than 3,000.
As is the case with Islamist separatists in Thailand and India’s Maoist guerrillas, derailments 
and rail infrastructure attacks represent only a small portion of what jihadist do. 
The database records only 17 jihadist attacks against railway infrastructure or attempts to 
derail trains. There were 10 derailment attempts and seven track attacks. The derailment 
attacks were, however, the most lethal of all the groups we have examined, with an 
average of 20.8 fatalities per attack, which is 3.9 times more lethal than the next most lethal 
group (Maoists, with an average of 5.4), and 5.5 times more lethal than the average (3.8), 
considerably above the other groups. At the same time, we note that jihadist groups 
operating in the developing world also carry out attacks on railway infrastructure not 
designed to kill, but to disrupt. This is an interesting aspect of a group which typically looks 
for high body counts. 
The breakdown of attacks and lethality of derailment attacks against intercity and commuter 
passenger trains (seven of which used bombs, and three of which were mechanical), and 
against railway track targets, is shown in Table 31 below.
Table 31. Jihadist Attacks by Target
Target Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Railway Tracks 5 29.4% 1 0.2 0.0 1 0.2 0.0
Railway Bridge 2 11.8% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Track Targets 7 41.2% 1 0.1 0.0 1 0.1 0.0
Train, Passenger 
(Intercity or 
Commuter) Targets
10 58.8% 208 20.8 0.0 320 32.0 0.0
All Targets 17 100.0% 209 12.3 0.0 321 18.9 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
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Despite Osama bin Laden’s personal interest and continuing jihadist exhortations to 
conduct mechanical derailments in the West, jihadists have made only few attempts 
to derail trains. As Table 32 shows, only three of the 10 derailment attempts involved 
mechanical sabotage. However, two spectacular mechanical derailments that we have 
attributed to jihadists drive the lethality of this method up—way up. These three attacks 
killed a total of 168 and injured 205, driving the average lethality per attack up to 56.0. This 
is 9.8 times the lethality of derailments involving explosives, in which seven attacks killed 
40 for an average lethality of 5.7—still high, but not spectacularly high. In fact, this set of 
three attacks is by far the most lethal combination of an attacker and a derailment method 
of any group in the MTI database. 
Table 32. Jihadist Derailments by Attack Method
Attack and Weapon Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Derailment, Track Bomb-
IED, Unspecified
7 70.0% 40 5.7 0.0 115 16.4 0.0
Derailment, Bolts/Tracks 
Removed
3 30.0% 168 56.0 20 205 68.3 80
All Attacks and Weapons 10 100.0% 208 20.8 0.0 320 32.0 0.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
The most lethal of these took place in the early morning hours on November 20, 2016, in 
which 14 carriages of the Indore-Patna Express derailed near the city of Kanpur in Uttar 
Pradseh State, India killing 148 and injuring 125. While the event was at first thought to 
be caused by a mechanical problem, Indian authorities have now stated that they suspect 
an ISIS module operating in the area.8,9 The second most lethal was six years earlier on 
November 27, 2009 when the Nevsky Express (a high-speed rail train running between 
Moscow and St. Petersburg) was derailed, killing 27 and injuring 95. 
All of the attacks against railway tracks and bridges were conducted with IEDs, killing only 
one person.
Thus far, the geography of the jihadist derailment and track attacks is also not particularly 
focused on the West. In fact, the jihadist attacks occur almost exclusively in the Russian 
Federation and developing countries, with the exception of two nonfatal attacks: one 
against a high-speed train in Spain, and the other an unsuccessful attempt by Algerian 
extremists to derail a French TGV in 1995. Table 33 shows the location of the derailment 
and track attacks by country.
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Table 33. Jihadist Attacks by Country
Country Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
India 7 41.2% 168 24.0 0.0 206 29.4 0.0
Russian Federation 4 23.5% 27 6.8 0.0 95 23.8 0.0
Iraq 2 11.8% 1 0.5 0.5 0 0.0 0.0
Algeria 1 5.9% 13 13.0 13.0 20 20.0 20.0
France 1 5.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 1 5.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
Spain 1 5.9% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Countries 17 100.0% 209 12.3 0.0 321 1.0 18.9
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
The highest FPA rates were attained in India, Algeria and then Russia. It is important, 
however, to put this lethality into context. Adversaries in Russia and Algeria fielded large 
guerrilla organizations, capable of ambitious operations. 
The Russian situation poses a challenge to the analysis. Over the years, Chechen rebels 
can be said to have morphed into jihadists; there is no precise date of this change. We 
have included only those attacks since the last two months of 2010—four in total, killing 
27 in all. Including all Chechen attacks since the beginning of the Second Chechen War in 
1999 under the jihadist label would add another five derailment attacks in Russia, which 
killed 12. Including the conflict in neighboring Dagestan would add another nine derailment 
attacks, which killed three persons. As seen in Table 34, including these attacks would 
considerably reduce Russia’s average FPA from 6.8 to 2.3. (Of course, adding these same 
attacks would reduce the overall FPA for all jihadist attacks from 12.3 to 7.2, and for 
derailment attacks alone, from 20.8 to 9.3).
Table 34. Chechen and Dagestan Attacks Added to Russian Jihadist Attacks
Russian Attack Subset Attacks Fatalities FPA1
India 4 27 6.8
Russian Federation 5 12 2.4
Iraq 9 3 0.3
All Russian Attacks Subset 18 42 2.3
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
Our analysis confirms the assertion that Jihadist attacks frequently aim for high body 
counts and tend to be more lethal than other groups. Considering jihadist attacks against 
passenger trains and train stations since 1970, Table 35 shows how various modes of 
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jihadist attack against a variety of these targets compare with one another. Even holding to 
the narrower and more lethal boundaries of jihadist attacks in Russia, the figures show that 
mechanical derailments are by far the most lethal jihadist attack method (56.0 FPA,) more 
than three times the overall average of 15.0. Furthermore, even though bomb derailments at 
3.3 are considerably below that same average, when combined with mechanical 
derailments, the derailment total becomes 25.9, well above the average. Certainly, high 
lethality can be achieved in operations that may be less technically challenging than 
derailing trains, such as shootings or bombings in crowded spaces. Derailments are very 
lethal, however, and offer the additional advantage of achieving high body counts without 
the necessity of carrying out a suicide attack. 
Table 35. All Jihadist Attack Methods Against Passenger Trains and Train Stations
Attack And Weapon Attacks
% of 
Total 
Attacks Fatalities
Average 
FPA1
Median 
FPA Injuries
Average 
IPA2
Median 
IPA
Derailment, Bolts/Tracks 
Removed
3 5.2% 168 56.0 20.0 205 68.3 80.0
IID (Improvised Incendiary 
Device)
2 3.4% 66 33.0 33.0 18 9.0 9.0
Assault, Automatic or 
Semi-Automatic 
Weapons
3 5.2% 59 19.7 0.0 120 40.0 12.0
IED, Unspecified 40 69.0% 553 13.8 0.0 3,936 98.4 11.5
VBIED 1 1.7% 7 7.0 7.0 20 20.0 20.0
Derailment, Track Bomb-
IED, Unspecified
4 6.9% 13 3.3 0.0 20 5.0 0.0
Assault, Stabbings 3 5.2% 2 0.7 0.0 5 1.7 0.0
Arson 2 3.4% 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0
All Attacks and Weapons 58 100.0% 868 15.0 0.0 4,324 74.6 9.0
Notes:
1 FPA = Fatalities per attack.
2 IPA = Injuries per attack.
Moreover, it is important to note that jihadists remain among all attackers of passenger 
train targets the most lethal adversaries. Ranked in terms of average deaths per attack, 
the relatively few jihadist attacks are 2.2 times more lethal than the next most lethal set of 
attackers, individuals who are mentally disordered, with an average lethality of 6.7. More 
significantly, they are 5.8 times more lethal than the average (2.6) of all the other terrorist 
groups in the MTI database combined. 
Turning back to the immediate small set of derailment and rail infrastructure attacks, 
the data show that the number and lethality of jihadist derailments and rail infrastructure 
or track attacks have been increasing over time, as Figures 10 and 11 illustrate. (The 
scale for attacks in Figure 11 is the same as in those charts used for Maoist and Thai 
Islamic separatist attacks for comparison.) Likewise, the scale for lethality had to expand 
significantly (in Figure 12) to capture the increased lethality of jihadist derailments.
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Figure 10. Jihadist Attacks Over Time – Scale Adjusted
	
Figure 11. Jihadist Lethality Over Time – Scale Constant
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Figure 12. Jihadist Lethality Over Time – Scale Adjusted
Looking at the explosive devices used by the jihadists in their attacks offers some surprises. 
Jihadists used 11 devices in seven derailment attempts and also 11 devices in seven track 
attacks for a total of 22 devices in 14 attacks. (The other three derailment attacks involved 
mechanical means of sabotage.) All but one of the devices used in both derailment attempts 
and rail infrastructure attacks were placed on the tracks. 
That is no surprise. What is surprising is the low success rate for the 11 devices used in the 
derailment attempts—5 out of 11, or 46% of these, were discovered before the attack (all 
by civilians) and rendered safe. For track attacks, 6 out of the 11 (56%) were discovered, 
this time by security officials. In track attacks the devices not found all detonated on target, 
and for derailments only 3 of the 6 did.
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For all devices used in both derailment attempts and track attacks, only 9 (or 41 percent) detonated on target on time, as seen in 
Table 36 below. This is the poorest performance record of the four groups examined.
Table 36. Jihadist Devices by Outcome
Device Outcome Devices
% of 
Total 
Devices Fatalities
Average 
FPD1
Median 
FPD
Average 
FPDE2 Injuries
Average 
IPD3
Median 
IPD
Average 
IPDE4
EOD Successful, Rendered Safe 10 45.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Detonated or Released on Target 9 40.9% 41 4.6 0.0 5.0 116 12.9 0.0 12.9
Detonated Early or Away from Target, or Malfunctioned 1 4.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Failed to Detonate or Release 1 4.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unknown 1 4.5% 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All Device Outcomes 22 100.0% 41 1.9 0.0 4.6 116 5.3 0.0 12.9
Notes:
1 FPD = Fatalities per device.
2 FPDE = Fatalities per device exploded.
3 IPD = Injuries per device.
4 IPDE = Injuries per device exploded.
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VI. CONCLUSION
These four campaigns provide an opportunity to more closely analyze a subset of track 
attacks and derailment attempts. The objectives and modus operandi of the four sets of 
adversaries differ. How they attack tracks and trains reflects their overall strategy. 
The European groups have sought to attract public attention to their issues that motivate 
them and cause disruption. Their actions resulted in inconvenience, but no casualties. 
Attacks on tracks and trains have been a minor component of the insurgency in Southern 
Thailand. The primary objectives of the insurgents in these attacks appear to have been 
to cause disruption and divert government security personnel to protecting rail lines. While 
the insurgents did not flinch at inflicting casualties on civilians, the attacks on railroads 
produced few casualties either because of the limited capabilities of the insurgents or 
because of self-imposed constraints. 
India’s Maoists are engaged in protracted guerrilla war. Their aims included creating 
spectacular attacks with high casualties, economic disruption, and the diversion of 
security resources to protecting the railways. The high percentage of explosive devices 
found suggests a robust security effort. Given the length of the campaign, one would look 
for evidence of growing technical proficiency, but this is hard to discern. However, Maoist 
attack have increased over time in volume and in lethality.
Jihadists are clearly the most lethal attackers, which is consistent with overall jihadist 
strategy and other forms of attack on transportation systems. Moreover, the volume and 
lethality of jihadist derailment attacks appear to be increasing. Derailments, however, are 
not the jihadists’ deadliest mode of attack. Bombings in crowded subways, commuted 
trains, train stations and bus depots are easier to do and are more lucrative in terms of 
casualties, although they generally expose the attackers to higher risks.
Track attacks to create disruption are easy, serve a variety of adversary goals, and no 
doubt will continue as a mode of protest and economic warfare. Spectacular derailments, 
however, will remain a terrorist quest.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula
Comm. Communications
EOD Explosive Ordinance Disposal
FPA Fatalities per Attack
FPD Fatalities per Device
FPDE Fatalites per Device Exploded
IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices
IIDs Improvised Incendiary Devices
IPA Injuries per Attack
IPD Injuries per Device
IPDE Injuries per Device Exploded
IRA Irish Republican Army
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and (greater) Syria
Mech Mechanical
MTI Mineta Transportation Institute
NIS Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union
NO-TAV No Trena di Alta Velocita 
(Italian group protesting high-speed rail lines)
Pax Passengers
RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade
VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
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ENDNOTES
1. Ibrahim Ibn Hassan Al-Asiri. “Targeting Means of Transportation.”Inspire, Issue 17, 
Summer 2017. 
2. Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean-Francois Clair, Off the Rails: 
The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV (High-Speed Train) and a Quantitative 
Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts (San Jose, CA: The Mineta Transportation 
Institute, 2010).
3. The authors realize that the term “Western Europe” lost its historical meaning with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union. However, they use it here to apply 
geographically to the countries of the western part of Europe. These were the theaters 
of the terrorist campaigns of the last quarter of the 20th century and have continued to 
be the principal venue for terrorist attacks since the 1990s. There are comparatively few 
attacks in the eastern countries of Europe, with the exception of Russia.
4. A detailed discussion of the IRA’s campaign against surface transportation in the United 
Kingdom can be found in Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, Protecting 
Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing 
Research on Best Security Practices, (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 
2001), https://transweb.sjsu.edu/research/protecting-surface-transportation-systems-
and-patrons-terrorist-activities 
5. For general accounts of the insurgency in Southern Thailand, see: Zachary Abuza, 
A Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency of Southern Thailand, (Washington DC: 
The United States Institute of Peace, 2009); Zachary Abuza and National Defense 
University, The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, 
Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics, (CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2012); Mohd Mizan Aslam, “The Southern Thailand 
Insurgency: Ideological and Identity Challenges,” Jati 13 (2008): 79-93, https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/265270788_THE_SOUTHERN_THAILAND_
INSURGENCY_IDEOLOGICAL_AND_IDENTITY_CHALLENGES; and Peter Chalk, 
The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 
Corporation, 2009). 
6. For general accounts of India’s Maoist Insurgency, see: E. N. Ram Mohan, Brigadier 
Amrit Pal Singh, and Gp. Capt. A.K. Agarwal, Maoist Insurgency and India’s Internal 
Security Architecture (New Delhi: VIJ Books, 2012); Bhashkar Sarkar VSM, Tackling 
the Maoist Insurgency (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2012); and T.N. Marwah, 
Beyond Naxalbari Maoist Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in India (Delhi: Gaurav 
Book Centre Pvt. Ltd, 2017).
7. Previous discussions of jihadist attacks on surface transportation can be found in: 
Brian Michael Jenkins and Joseph Trella, Carnage Interrupted: An Analysis of Fifteen 
Terrorist Plots against Surface Transportation (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation 
Institute, 2012), https://transweb.sjsu.edu/research/carnage-interrupted-analysis-
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
54
Endnotes
fifteen-terrorist-plots-against-public-surface-transportation; Brian Michael Jenkins 
and Bruce R. Butterworth, By the Numbers: Russia’s Terrorists Increasingly Target 
Transportation, (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2014), https://
transweb.sjsu.edu/research/Numbers-Russia%E2%80%99s-Terrorists-Increasingly-
Target-Transportation; Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Mineta 
Transportation Institute Says Subways Still in Terrorists’ Sights, (San Jose, CA: 
Mineta Transportation Institute, 2014), https://transweb.sjsu.edu/research/Mineta-
Transportation-Institute-Says-Subways-Are-Still-Terrorists%E2%80%99-Sights; and 
Brian Michael Jenkins and Jean-Francois Clair, Trains, Concert Halls, Airports, and 
Restaurant—All Soft Targets: What the Terrorist Campaign in France and Belgium 
Tells Us about the Future of Jihadist Terrorism in Europe, (San Jose, CA: The Mineta 
Transportation Institute, 2016), https://transweb.sjsu.edu/research/trains-concert-
halls-airports-and-restaurants%E2%80%94all-soft-targets-what-terrorist-campaign
8. Business Standard, “ISI behind Train Derailments, NIA Finds Merit in Bihar Police’s 
Claim,” (January 27, 2017), http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/
isi-behind-train-derailments-nia-finds-merit-in-bihar-police-s-claim-117012700373_1.
html (accessed June 28, 2018).
9. The Times of India, “Police Suspect Pakistan’s Spy Agency ISI Hand in Two Rail 
Accidents in Uttar Pradesh,” (January 18, 2017), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/police-suspect-pakistans-spy-agency-isi-hand-in-two-rail-accidents-in-uttar-
pradesh-that-killed-151-passengers/articleshow/56634949.cms (accessed June 28, 
2018).
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